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INTERDEPENDENCE AMONG FISCAL POLICY, INEQUALITY AND ECONOMIC 
GROWTH AT A PROVINCIAL LEVEL IN ARGENTINA. 1995-2010.* 
Walter Cont, Alberto Porto and María Minatta** 
Abstract 
This paper estimates a complete empirical model of the joint determinants of fiscal policy, inequality and economic 
growth in Argentina. To this end, we construct a balanced panel data of the 24 Argentinian jurisdictions for the 
period 1995-2010 and estimate two types of equations systems: a simultaneous equation model, which considers the 
interdependence between the variables considered, and a system of seemingly unrelated regressions, which generates 
gains in efficiency. The paper is novel in applying this strategy at a subnational level. The main results are the 
following. There is a trade-off between inequality and growth but growth has a slightly positive effect on (reducing) 
inequality. Distributive expenditures reduce inequality without harming growth if they are financed with direct taxes; 
other ways of financing introduce distortions on efficiency or equity dimensions that may cancel out (or at least 
make unclear) the expected effects. Direct taxes are a strong instrument when the government needs to raise funds. 
Tax reforms that seek to reduce global tax levels could take the opportunity of increasing the share of direct taxes.  
Key words: fiscal policy, inequality, economic growth, subnational governments. 
Resumen 
Este trabajo estima un modelo de determinación conjunta de política fiscal, desigualdad y crecimiento para la 
Argentina. Se construye un panel balanceado con las 24 jurisdicciones sub-nacionales para 1995-2010. Se estiman 
dos tipos de sistemas de ecuaciones: un sistema de ecuaciones simultáneas que tiene en cuenta la interdependencia 
entre las variables y un sistema de regresiones aparentemente no relacionadas que genera ganancias de eficiencia. El 
trabajo es novedoso ya que a nuestro saber es el primero que aplica esta estrategia a nivel sub-nacional. Los 
principales resultados son los siguientes. Hay un trade-off entre desigualdad y crecimiento, pero el crecimiento tiene 
efecto levemente positivo sobre la desigualdad. Los gastos distributivos reducen la desigualdad sin afectar 
negativamente el crecimiento, cuando son financiados con impuestos directos. Otras formas de financiamiento 
introducen distorsiones en la eficiencia o en la equidad que pueden compensar los efectos positivos. Los impuestos 
directos son un importante instrumento para aumentar la recaudación. De este modo, una política que busque reducir 
la presión tributaria global debería, a la vez, incrementar su participación en la presión impositiva global. 
Palabras clave: política fiscal, desigualdad, crecimiento económico, gobiernos subnacionales. 
JEL: H7, H5, I3 
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INTERDEPENDENCE AMONG FISCAL POLICY, INEQUALITY AND ECONOMIC 
GROWTH AT A PROVINCIAL LEVEL IN ARGENTINA. 1995-2010. 
1. Introduction 
This paper estimates a complete empirical model of the relationship between fiscal policy, 
inequality and economic growth in Argentina. In the economic literature there has been a 
growing concern on the interaction between fiscal policy and economic performance on both 
efficiency and equity dimensions. A strand of this literature, starting with Benabou (2000), is 
worried on different performances (or “unequal societies”) arising from common fundamentals. 
The author began a series of research (2000, 2002, 2005), which was followed by several works 
of Ramos and Roca-Sagalés (2008), Roca-Sagalés and Sala (2011) and Muinelo-Gallo and Roca-
Sagalés (2011, 2013). Specifically, economic policy decisions may be strongly affected by gross 
(that is, before fiscal policy) income inequality and strongly affect the joint evolution of 
performance in both economic growth and net (or ex post) distribution of income. 
We move in two directions, which make the contribution novel. First, we concentrate on a 
developing country –Argentina– located in Latin America. Second, we take the analysis to a sub-
national level. The first direction is important in itself as there has been little research on specific 
countries (with the exception of UK and Sweden, studied by Ramos and Roca-Sagalés, 2008, and 
Roca-Sagalés and Sala, 2011) and no research (as of our knowledge) on a developing country. 
The second direction is also relevant in itself as we push the idea of different societies with 
common fundamentals a step further. In a country (for the case, Argentina) the social contract can 
be understood as set at the national level although differ at a jurisdictional level in terms of 
output and income distribution. Hence, the questions of the effect of fiscal policy on income 
distribution and growth and the relationship between outcomes in different dimensions gain 
relevance. 
Section 2 places this research within the literature on growth, inequality and fiscal policy. Section 
3 briefly describes the case of Argentina. Section 4 details the econometric strategy. Section 5 
presents the main results and Section 6 concludes. Complementary material is relegated to the 
Appendix. 
2. Literature on growth, inequality and fiscal policy 
2.1. Main relationships 
This section reviews the most relevant papers on growth, income inequality and policy variables 
linked to our paper. A starting work is Barro (1999), who explores several theories that assess the 
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macroeconomic relationship between economic growth and inequality, with offsetting effects. 
Active income redistribution appears to involve a tradeoff between the benefits of equality and a 
reduction in overall economic growth. The author claims that the Kuznets curve –whereby 
inequality first increases and later decreases during the process of economic development–
emerges as a clear empirical regularity, having found that higher inequality tends to retard growth 
in poor countries and encourage growth in rich ones. 
In a challenging paper, Welch (1999) says “I believe inequality is an economic ‘good’ and 
consider that it has received too much bad press”. Focusing on labor markets the author 
emphasizes that wage inequality is good since it signals labor and skill scarcity, provides 
incentives for investments in human capital and compensates for different job attributes. But, on 
the other hand, inequality becomes destructive when society does not view effort as worthwhile 
and upward mobility is perceived unlikely or even impossible.  
Traditional political economy models, under the assumption of perfect capital markets, highlight 
that a greater degree of inequality motivates redistribution through the political process; higher 
redistributive transfers and the associated taxes distort economic decisions reducing investment 
and growth. On the other hand, in models with credit-market imperfection, the limited ability to 
borrow means that rates of return on investment opportunities are not necessarily equated at the 
margin because the exploitation of investment opportunities depends, to some extent, on 
individuals’ levels of assets and incomes. If capital markets and legal institutions tend to improve 
as economies develop, then this effect may have a positive effect on both equality and growth. 
Socio-political arguments stress that the tendency for redistribution to reduce crimes and riots 
provides a mechanism whereby this redistribution and the resulting greater income equality 
would enhance economic growth (see also Alesina and Rodrik, 1994). According to Persson and 
Tabellini (1994, p. 618), inequality is harmful for growth because, through the political-economy 
process, it leads to the demand of redistribution that do not protect property rights, affecting 
investment negatively. On another hand, in economies where saving rates increase with the level 
of income, redistribution of resources from rich to poor tends to lower the aggregate saving rate, 
and hence a reduction in inequality tends to affect investment negatively (this effects arises if the 
economy is partially closed, so that domestic investment depends, to some extent, on desired 
national saving). In this case, more inequality would enhance economic growth (Barro, 1999).  
Although there is no agreement on the sign of the relationship, economy models stress that fiscal 
policy can play a major role in explaining the evolution of both macro aggregates. In this sense, 
fiscal policy is considered as an endogenous variable that reflects the voters’ preferences for 
income distribution (Persson and Tabellini, 2000, ch. 14).  
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Through the empirical model proposed, we test the relationships between fiscal policy, inequality 
and growth and evaluate the main determinants of different fiscal policy outcomes and their 
impact on the evolution of economic growth and net income inequality. 
2.2. Control variables 
When we estimate the effects of inequality and fiscal policy on growth, we use a specification 
that is commonly accepted in the cross-country growth literature. We consider initial income, 
population growth (Barro, 1991), human capital and a measure of trade openness (Lundberg and 
Squire, 2003; Mendoza et al., 1997).  
The equation on income inequality is based on the empirical approaches of Castelló and 
Doménech (2002), Li and Zou (1998), Li et al. (1998), and Lundberg and Squire (2003). Controls 
for the inequality equation should include a measure of educational inequality as a proxy of asset 
inequality, but given a lack of information at the subnational level, we use a measure of 
educational level instead. 
Control variables for the fiscal policy equations are like those that appear in the theoretical model 
by Benabou (2000). Institutional, demographic and economic variables have been considered as 
additional control variables, following Persson and Tabellini (2000, 2003). To capture political 
economy effects on fiscal policy and inequality we use the number of senators and house 
representatives, whether the province is governed by a Peronist governor and whether there is 
alignment between the political parties at the national and provincial levels (official party). In 
order to take into account the influence of the differences in provincial levels of development, we 
include each jurisdiction’s (lagged) per capita income as an explanatory variable. We also include 
the percentage of the population aged 65 years old or more assess the link between demographic 
composition of the population and government expenditures. In addition, we incorporate public 
employment to test the bureaucracy theory (Niskanen, 1968). This theory proposes that 
bureaucrats expand public expenditure beyond the efficient level in order to maximize their 
power. A measure of the power of bureaucracy used in empirical papers is the relationship 
between public employees and total employment at the jurisdiction (Borcherding et al. 1977).1 
Second generation theories of fiscal federalism (Oates, 2005; Weingast, 2009) study performance 
of subnational governments in absence of a hard budget constraint due to intergovernmental 
transfers that allows them to live beyond their means (higher expenditures and subsidies, lower 
taxes, and so on). Additionally, empirical studies have shown that transfers have a larger effect 
on the increase of expenditure than income; this finding has been baptized as flypaper effect 
                                                          




(Hines and Thaler, 1995). To consider these effects, we incorporate the ratio of transfers to total 
income of the jurisdictions as a control variable. Finally, several works have studied the effects of 
globalization on the level and structure of public expenditure and other variables in the public 
sector (Azzimonti, de Francisco and Quadrini, 2014; Garrett, 1998; Heinemann, 2000; Rodrik, 
1997; Rodrik, 1998). Papers that concentrate specifically on the impact of globalization on the 
level and structure of public expenditures have distinguished two effects: “efficiency” and 
“compensation”. The efficiency approach states that the government reduces taxes and social 
expenditures while preserving the functions of essential public goods such as defense, security 
and justice in order to promote international trade and attract investments (Breton and Ursprung, 
2002, Sinn, 2004). Under this framework, globalization reduces the range and size of welfare 
programs. The compensation approach proposes the opposite effect. The government faces a role 
of insurer, compensating –through social welfare programs– individuals and / or regions that may 
be adversely affected by economic openness and globalization (Cameron, 1978, Rodrik, 1998). In 
this sense, Porto et al. (2016) find that, at a subnational level, economic openness and 
globalization have a negative impact on the participation of social expenditures. Goode (1984) 
found that more open economies have larger governments that might reflect the increased 
demand for social insurance in more open economies or the readily available tax bases resulting 
from taxes on exports and imports. Both effects may cancel so that the level of openness and 
globalization may not alter the composition and / or size of the public sector.  
3. The case of Argentina 
Argentina is a country located in South America. Average per capita income ascended to 
US$9,000 in 2010. This average, however, hides large regional disparities, with provincial 
incomes ranging from US$ 27,508 in the city of Buenos Aires to US$ 3,781 in the province of 
Santiago del Estero. Such disparities also hold for other social indicators (Unsatisfied Basic 
Needs, for example), although other indicators may indicate less provincial heterogeneity 
(Human Development Index). Table A1 in the Appendix contains detailed information on these 
indicators.  
During the period under study (1995-2010) Argentina underwent different socioeconomic stages. 
A first sub-period is part of the so-called Convertibility, which was a socio-economic regime 
characterized by fixed exchange rate, macroeconomic stability and tight fiscal accounts. During 
this period, the economy moved from growth and increasing inequality (1995-1998) to recession 
and increasing inequality (1999-2002), to an economic crisis in 2002. A second sub-period is 
known as “post-Convertibility”, and is characterized by high real exchange rate, high inflation 
and slack fiscal accounts. During this period the economy engaged in steady growth accompanied 
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by decreasing inequality (2003-2010). The left panel of Figure 1 shows the evolution of GDP and 
of income inequality. 
Figure 1. Evolution of per capita GDP (in thousands of constant Pesos of 2010), income 
inequality (Gini index), and consolidated –national and provincial– fiscal expenditure and 
balance (percent of GDP) 
  
The consolidated nation-provinces expenditure oscillated between 29 percent and 35 percent of 
GDP during 1995-2001, to later plummet to around 27 percent of GDP during a three-year 
period.2 Since then, it grew constantly to peak 40 percent in the last year of the sample (and 45 
percent in 2014). Tax pressure kept it up to a higher pace, from 28 percent of GDP in 1995-2001 
to 34 percent of GDP in 2003-2010, turning the fiscal balance from an average 4-percent deficit 
to an average 1-percent surplus (see right panel of Figure 1).  
Table 1 summarizes the evolution of expenditures and taxes through several decompositions (as 
shares of expenditures or taxes, respectively), comparing averages for the total sample and the 
two selected sub-periods.3 Some interesting observations emerge from this table. First, the sum of 
social spending on education and health remained stable (about 26 percent) between periods. 
Social security, which is mostly direct expenditure, lost 2 points of share from between 1995-
2001 and 2003-2010, which were gained by direct transfers in social promotion and assistance, 
and work plans. Subsidies on the consumption of energy (natural gas and electricity) and 
transport are the main component of economic services, which increased 5 points of share in total 
                                                          
2 Municipal budgets are excluded because detailed information is unavailable. They represent 8 percent of total 
expenditure in Argentina. Nonetheless, they are indirectly considered in the analysis through the transfers from 
provinces to municipalities (which represent about half of municipal expenditures).  
3 In this paper we define expenditures into two categories: distributive (social protection, health, housing and 
education) and non-distributive (general services, defense, public order and safety and economic affairs). Revenues 
are classified into three categories: direct taxes (taxes on income, profits and capital gains, payroll taxes and property 
taxes), indirect taxes (taxes on goods and services, taxes on international trade and transactions), and other revenues 
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expenditure. Finally, provincial expenditure gained 1 point of share between 1995-2001 and 
2003-2010 (concentrated on social services). 
Table 1. Argentina. Composition of consolidated (nation-provinces) expenditures and taxes. 
Selected periods 1995-2001 and 2003-2010 











Percent of Total Expenditure Percent of Total Revenues 
Administration, defense, 
safety 21% 22% 20% 
Production, 
consumption, trade 50% 47% 52% 
Social services 61% 60% 61%    - VAT 21% 23% 20% 
   - Education and health 26% 26% 25%    - Export taxes 5% 0% 8% 
   - Social security 26% 27% 25%    - Other domestic taxes 22% 21% 22% 
   - Promotion, assistance, 
work 7% 6% 8%    - Other trade taxes 3% 3% 2% 
   - Other social services 3% 2% 3% Income and  assets 38% 38% 37% 
Economic services 9% 7% 12%    - Income + asset taxes 15% 13% 17% 
   - Energy 2% 0% 3%    - Social security contributions 20% 21% 18% 
   - Other economic services 8% 6% 9%    - Other taxes on income 3% 4% 2% 
Debt services 8% 10% 7% Other taxes 12% 15% 10% 
                
National expenditure 54% 54% 53% National taxes 76% 74% 77% 
Provincial expenditure 46% 46% 47% Provincial taxes 24% 26% 23% 
Source: own elaboration based on public national and provincial accounts. 
On the revenue side, there has been an increase in the share of taxes on production, consumption 
and transactions, from 47 percent of total taxes in 1995-2001 to 52 percent in 2003-2010, and a 
slight reduction of taxes on income and assets (from 38 percent to 37 percent) and other taxes. 
Within production and transaction taxes, there was a shift from VAT (from 23 percent to 20 
percent) to export taxes (from 0 to 8 percent). On the other hand, within direct income taxes there 
was a shift of social security contributions (from 21 percent to 18 percent), to –mostly personal– 
income and asset taxes (from 13 percent to 17 percent). Finally, taxation shifted away from 
provincial resources to national resources (from 74 percent to 77 percent). 
4. The empirical model 
We construct a system of three equations that describes the relationship among endogenous 
variables: (I) economic growth, (II) net income inequality and (III) fiscal policy outcomes, 
closely following Muinelo-Gallo and Roca-Sagalés (2013). Then we estimate the system of 




4.1. Econometric model 
Growth equation 
Regional growth in per capita GDP (Δy) is related to net inequality (NI, as in Barro, 1990, and 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992), fiscal policy (FP, as in Kneller et al., 1999, to avoid biases that 
an incomplete specification of the government budget constraint could imply) and other non-
fiscal control variables (X vector): 
  ∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝜅 𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽 ∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑘 + ∑ �𝛾𝑗 − 𝛾𝑚�𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑗 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑚−1𝑗=1𝐾𝑘=1      (1) 
where sub-index it refers to province i in period t. To avoid collinearity, we use a vector FP of 
fiscal variables that includes all but one element. The omitted variable within FPit is assumed to 
be the compensating instrument in the government’s budget constraint. This way the 
interpretation of the estimated coefficient of each fiscal variable is the net effect of a unit change 
in the relevant fiscal variable compensated by a unit change in the omitted variable. 
Economic inequality 
In line with Li and Zou (1998), Li et al. (1998), Castelló and Doménech (2002), and Lundberg 
and Squire (2003), net inequality depends on growth, fiscal policy and non-fiscal control 
variables (Z vector): 
  𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿 + 𝜔Δy𝑖𝑡 + 𝜓∑ 𝑍𝑖𝑡𝑙𝐿𝑙=1 + ∑ �𝜁𝑗 − 𝜁𝑚�𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑗𝑚−1
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   (2) 
Fiscal policy 
The fiscal policy outcome j-th (which is the excluded one in the previous equations) depends on 
lagged gross inequality (GI, i.e., income before taxes and government transfers) and a set of 
control variables (vector W). This configuration is based on the empirical approaches of Persson 
and Tabellini (2000, 2003), and 
    𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑗 =  𝜒 + 𝜆𝐺𝐼𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝜙∑ W𝑖𝑡
𝑔 + 𝜂𝑖𝑡𝐺𝑔=1    (3) 
To carry out the estimation we consider two types of equation systems. The first one is the 
Simultaneous Equation Model (SEM) on (1)-(3), which makes it possible to analyze the joint 
interdependence between growth, inequality and fiscal policy variables. The second approach is 
the Seemingly Unrelated Regressions Model (SUR) which assumes that the explicit relationship 
between endogenous variables is null (κ=0 in equation (1) and ω=0 in equation (2)), and that 
disturbances from the different equations at a given point in time are correlated because of 
common unobservable factors. This way, the SUR system exploits the efficiency gains derived 
from the assumed interdependence of the error terms of the three equations but at the cost of 
omitting the interactions among the relevant variables. 
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In both approaches, in order to avoid endogeneity problems, fiscal policy and net inequality (the 
latter only appears on the SEM growth equation) are lagged one period in the growth equation 
and gross inequality is lagged one period in the fiscal policy equation. This control is not 
necessary in the net inequality equation as the explained variable is ex post.  
4.2. Description of the data 
The data panel consists of 24 provincial jurisdictions in Argentina (23 provinces and the city of 
Buenos Aires) covered from 1995 to 2010. Table 2 shows the relevant variables. 
Table 2. Description of the variables 
VARIABLES Description; unit of measure 
GDP Real GDP per capita, in logs 
Growth Annual GDP growth 
Initial GDP 1995 per capita GDP, in logs 
Gross income inequality Gini index of gross income 
Net income inequality Gini index of net –extended– income 
Population growth Annual growth rate of population 
Education level Alphabetized population as a percentage of total population 
Trade – KOFA Index Proxy that measures globalization from different angles 
Distributive expenditure Expenditures on social protection, health, housing and education, as a share of GDP.  
Non-distributive 
expenditure 
Expenditures on general public services, defense, public order and safety, and economic 
affairs as a share of GDP  
Direct taxes Revenues of general government due to direct taxes as a share of GDP 
Indirect taxes Revenues of general government due to indirect taxes as a share of GDP 
Deficit Total revenues minus total outlays of general government as a share of GDP 
Peronist party Dummy that takes the value of 1 if the ruling party is Peronist and zero otherwise 
Population >65 years Population ages 65 and above as a percentage of the total population 
Senators Senators per million of habitants 
House representatives House representatives per million of habitants 
Official party Dummy that takes the value of 1 if the ruling party at the jurisdictional level is the same 
as at the national one and zero otherwise 
Provincial employment Provincial public employment to total population 
Transfers effect Transfers to total income 
 
Data on economic, political and social variables is obtained from several sources such as 
Ministerio de Hacienda y Finanzas Públicas, INDEC, CFI, ASAP, INDEC and ECLAC.4 
As it is standard in the literature, the growth variable Δyit is calculated on the per capita GDP, net 
inequality NI is measured by the Gini index of inequality after considering the effects of fiscal 
                                                          
4 This data is included in Cont and Porto (2017). Interested readers are referred to this source. 
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policy, gross inequality GI is measured by the Gini index of inequality before disentangling the 
effects of fiscal policy. 
We use three-year averages for all the variables for two main reasons. First, because year-to-year 
changes in fiscal policy variables and several control variables are not expected to have effect on 
changes in economic growth and inequality. Second, because taking three-year averages reduces 
the short run fluctuations and therefore the influence of the economic cycle allowing us to focus 
on the structural relationships. After calculating the averages we are left with 5 observations for 
each jurisdiction, totaling 120 observations. This strategy is also followed by Muinelo-Gallo and 
Roca-Sagalés (2013). 
5. Results 
Table 3 presents the results obtained from the SEM model. Table A2 in the Appendix compares 
these results with those of the SUR model  
In the first equation, we find a positive significant impact of inequality on economic growth. This 
result points out the fact that reducing inequality comes at the cost of harming growth and is in 
line with the arguments that indicate that inequality is good for incentives and therefore good for 
growth. On the other hand, the relationship between growth to net inequality is not statistically 
significant. However, in three out of four equations, the sign is negative, which may suggest that 
provinces with higher growth rate may experience some spillovers on income distribution. This 
combination of results is in line with those obtained by Muinelo-Gallo and Roca-Sagalés (2013) 
for OECD countries. Also, Cont and Porto (2016) find similar results when analyzing the 
relationship between inequality and the level of GDP (rather than growth). Therefore, the result 
of provinces being on the negative-sloped side of the Kuznetz’s inverted-U relationship seems to 
be strong, both at the GDP level and at its growth. 
In the first equation, we obtain that levels of per capita GDP have no significant effect on GDP 
growth, in line with papers that find no convergence in Argentinian provinces (Elías, 1995; Porto, 
1995; Wellington, 1998; and Llach and Grotz, 2013). Also, population growth has no significant 
effect on growth.  
Provinces with higher level of education show higher levels of growth rates (in line with Barro, 
1991) and lower levels of inequality, so that improvements in education achievements are an 
important tool to jointly improve growth and income distribution. Higher exposure to 
international trade is associated with higher levels of growth rates; this result is also found by 
Frankel and Romer (1999), Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000), and Greenaway et al. (2000). The 
effects of other institutional variables on inequality are not found to be significant. 
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Table 3. Regression results – SEM model 
VARIABLES Growth 
Net inequality (lagged) 0.475*** 0.569*** 0.371*** 0.510*** 
Initial GDP -0.025 -0.069 -0.083 -0.035 
Population growth -0.009 -0.013 -0.015 -0.010 
Education level (human capital) 1.351** 1.664*** 1.026* 1.629*** 
Trade 0.559*** 0.622*** 0.551*** 0.754*** 
Distributive expenditure (lagged)   -0.944** -0.158 -0.274 
Non-distributive expenditure (lagged) -0.726   -0.837* -0.029 
Direct taxes (lagged) 0.591* 1.530***   1.204** 
Indirect taxes (lagged) 0.747** 0.911*** 1.205***   
Constant -1.557*** -1.717*** -0.907 -1.773*** 
Observations 120 120 120 120 
R-squared 0.466 0.477 0.455 0.453 
VARIABLES Net Inequality 
Education level -2.443*** -2.326*** -2.436*** -2.396*** 
Growth -0.064 0.028 -0.117 -0.048 
Distributive expenditure   0.311 -0.472*** 0.096 
Non-distributive expenditure -0.774***   -0.883*** -0.721*** 
Direct taxes -0.678*** -1.096***   -0.767** 
Indirect taxes 0.126 -0.728*** 0.395   
Peronist party 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.010 
Constant 3.118*** 3.003*** 3.122*** 3.072*** 
Observations 120 120 120 120 









Trade 0.197* 0.113 0.199*** 0.522*** 
Gross inequality (lagged) 0.003 -0.0734* 0.006 0.011 
Population >65 years 1.285** 0.521 0.197 0.267 
GDP (lagged) -0.349*** -0.157*** -0.117*** -0.096*** 
Senators -0.413 0.170 -0.334 1.137* 
Representatives 0.447 -0.011 0.176 -0.645* 
Official party 0.009 0.013 0.013* 0.014** 
Provincial employment 2.991*** 2.433*** 0.661*** 0.374 
Transfers effect 0.198*** 0.168*** 0.059 -0.071** 
Constant 1.224*** 0.564*** 0.463*** 0.489*** 
Observations 120 120 120 120 
R-squared 0.727 0.739 0.569 0.663 
Notes: see full table in Appendix – Table A2. Statistical significance: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. 
The effect of fiscal policy from the expenditure side on growth is quite limited. We find that 
provinces that contribute more to both direct and indirect taxation (independently of the financing 
instrument) display higher growth rates. However, the effect on income distribution depends on 
the combination of fiscal instruments. Non-distributive expenditures and direct taxes are found to 
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decrease inequality, independently of how they are financed. Distributive expenditures reduce 
inequality only when financed with direct taxes. And indirect taxes reduce inequality only when 
financed with non-distributive expenditure.  
These results are interesting when re-designing fiscal systems. First, they suggest that distributive 
expenditures (being education and health the most important ones) reduce income inequality 
without harming growth if they are financed with direct taxes. Other ways of financing 
distributive expenditures introduce distortions on efficiency or equity dimensions that may cancel 
out the expected effects. Second, a unique characteristic emerges with direct taxes, in that they 
are a source of contribution to growth and income distribution (even more in the latter dimension 
if complemented with distributive expenditure). In any case, tax reforms that seek to reduce 
global levels could, at the same time, increase the share of direct taxes.5 Finally, it is striking that 
non-distributive expenditures look like a redistributive tool, but they have a clear negative effect 
on growth when replacing distributive expenditures or being finances by direct taxes. We 
consider that further research should be in order, given that we only considered the level of 
expenditure, while a full analysis on redistribution should ponder both level and the progressive 
effect.6 
The lower panel of the table shows the regression of economic and institutional variables on 
fiscal policy. First, the level of GDP is negatively related to the four fiscal instruments. Provinces 
with higher initial GDP have lower expenditure and lower taxes, which is reasonable in 
Argentina. The way that fiscal policy works is that the city of Buenos Aires, and the provinces of 
Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Mendoza and Santa Fe finance the other provinces. Some of the 
beneficiaries of regional redistribution are provinces with lower per capita GDP (poor provinces 
like Chaco) but also provinces with higher per capita GPD (low density provinces, like Santa 
Cruz). Second, there is a negative relationship between ex-ante inequality and non-distributive 
expenditure, which is a reasonable result. Third, the relationship between openness and size of 
fiscal policy is positive (in the case of non-distributive expenditures the effect is not significant). 
This evidence is consistent with Porto et al. (2016) for provincial expenditures and Garbero 
(2016) for consolidated expenditures: the relationship between openness and the size of total 
expenditures is positive. Fourth, provinces with a higher share of population in retirement age 
demand more expenditure (both distributive and non-distributive), which is reasonable.  
                                                          
5 Of course, this assessment is based on the growth and inequality effect. Usually, taxes that are easy collect are also 
distortionary and less transparent. 
6 First, this effect was already identified in Cont and Porto (2016). The authors find a stronger effect of economic 
services than social services on ex post inequality. Second, Cont and Porto (2015) analyze the distributive impact of 
consolidated budgets and show that social expenditure is more progressive than expenditure on economics services 
and administration (which, together, constitute the non-distributive expenditure in this paper). Also, the size of social 
expenditure doubles the size of non-distributive expenditure.  
13 
 
Regarding the political control variables, we find weak evidence that redistributive expenditure is 
lower but contribution to indirect taxes is higher in provinces with more representation in the 
Senate, and the opposite result for provinces with more representatives in the House.7 Also, 
provinces which are aligned with the Governing Party spend slightly more, but contribute more 
taxes. 
As expected from the theory of bureaucracy, provinces with higher public employment to total 
population (our measure of its power) present higher expenditures (distributive and non-
distributive) and higher taxes. Finally, in line with the second-generation theory of fiscal 
federalism, provinces with higher share of transfers to total revenues have higher expenditures 
and also contribute more taxes (in particular, direct taxes).8   
6. Conclusions 
This paper estimates a complete empirical model of the relationship between fiscal policy, 
inequality and economic growth in Argentina. It takes the analysis to a sub-national level for 
1995-2010 and follows the econometric strategy of Simultaneous Equation Model, which makes 
it possible to analyze the joint interdependence between growth, inequality and fiscal policy 
variables. 
We find, on the one hand, a trade-off between two “luxuries”: equality and growth. But, on the 
other hand, provinces with higher growth rates may have a leverage on reducing inequality.  
Some results are interesting for re-designing fiscal systems. Distributive expenditures (being 
education and health the most important ones) reduce inequality without affecting growth 
significantly if they are financed with direct taxes, but other ways of financing introduce 
distortions on efficiency or equity dimensions that may reduce or cancel out the expected effect. 
Non-distributive expenditures have an effect in reducing inequality although this striking result 
deserves a deeper analysis. Finally, direct taxes seem to be a strong instrument when the 
                                                          
7 This result does not enter into conflict with those obtained by Bercoff and Meloni (2009) and Porto, Cont and 
Juarros (2014). These authors estimate economic and political economy determinants of the geographic allocation of 
the national expenditure, transfers and/or national budget, and find a negative relationship between Senators and 
expenditure-taxes and a positive relationship between Representatives and expenditure-taxes. In this paper we 
proceed in two different directions. First, we consolidate national and provincial expenditures, which may introduce 
another effect, that low density and poorer provinces (with more representation in the Senate and in the House) have 
higher per capita provincial expenditure. Second, we decompose expenditure into redistributive and non-
redistributive, which may be differently affected by the political economy variables. We do not perform a full 
comparison with the cited papers, but an interesting research line is whether and to what extent the national and 
provincial expenditures, on the one hand, and redistributive and non-redistributive expenditures, on the other hand, 
complement or substitute each other when interacting with political dimensions. 
8 This last result is difficult to rationalize, as governments with soft budget constraints may engage in expenditures 
and taxes that are hard to explain.  
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government needs to raise funds so that tax reforms that seek to reduce global tax levels could, at 
the same time, take the opportunity of increasing the share of direct taxes.  
Control variables have the expected signs and are in line with the empirical literature. Education 
improves distribution, there is no convergence among provinces, more open provinces have 
higher growth rates, and bureaucracy and the financing with transfers increase expenditures and 
taxes. 
As it is always the case in empirical research, results should be taken with caution. However, 
there are many interesting research questions to pursue. One has to do with the robustness of 
results in a larger time span. Another interesting question could be the decomposition of national 
and provincial budgets in the interaction with inequality and growth. Some results found in this 
paper hide different effects from national and provincial budgets that may complement or 
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Appendix.   















Buenos Aires 307,571 15,316 49.8 130,332 8,510 0.84 8% 
City Bs As (CABA) 200 3,058 15291.5 84,128 27,508 0.89 6% 
Catamarca 102,602 404 3.9 3,253 8,047 0.84 11% 
Chaco 99,633 1,071 10.8 4,117 3,844 0.81 18% 
Chubut 224,686 471 2.1 5,854 12,436 0.85 8% 
Córdoba 165,321 3,397 20.5 26,671 7,852 0.86 6% 
Corrientes 88,199 1,036 11.7 4,259 4,112 0.83 15% 
Entre Ríos 78,781 1,282 16.3 7,861 6,132 0.84 8% 
Formosa 72,066 556 7.7 1,919 3,453 0.81 20% 
Jujuy 53,219 698 13.1 3,089 4,422 0.83 15% 
La Pampa 143,440 341 2.4 1,823 5,338 0.86 4% 
La Rioja 89,680 355 4.0 1,526 4,294 0.83 12% 
Mendoza 148,827 1,766 11.9 12,282 6,956 0.85 8% 
Misiones 29,801 1,111 37.3 7,402 6,660 0.82 16% 
Neuquén 94,078 565 6.0 7,780 13,764 0.86 10% 
Río Negro 203,013 604 3.0 4,790 7,933 0.85 9% 
Salta 155,488 1,267 8.2 5,006 3,950 0.83 19% 
San Juan 89,651 715 8.0 3,293 4,605 0.83 10% 
San Luis 76,748 457 6.0 3,020 6,611 0.83 8% 
Santa Cruz 243,943 234 1.0 3,767 16,092 0.87 8% 
Santa Fe 133,007 3,285 24.7 32,966 10,035 0.85 6% 
Santiago del Estero 136,351 884 6.5 3,340 3,781 0.81 18% 
Tierra del Fuego 21,571 134 6.2 2,551 19,081 0.88 14% 
Tucumán 22,524 1,512 67.1 6,615 4,377 0.84 13% 
Argentina 2,780,400 40,519 14.6 367,643 9,073 0.85 9% 
(std. deviation)         0.64 0.03 0.51 
Source: own elaboration based on INDEC Argentina (surface, population, and Unsatisfied Basic Needs), and United Nations (Human 
Development Index). GGP published by Council of Federal Investment (CFI) until 2006 and then updated by regional drivers, and expanded to the 
GPD using national accounts, with base 1993 Note: A: Advanced; I: Intermediate; LD: Low Density; L: Lagged. The exchange rate was 3.93 
Argentine pesos per dollar in year 2010. 
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Table A2. Regression results - SEM and SUR models. 
  SEM SUR 
VARIABLES Growth Growth 
Net inequality 0.475*** 0.569*** 0.371*** 0.510***         
Initial GDP -0.025 -0.069 -0.083 -0.035 0.002 -0.061 -0.141** -0.081 
Population growth -0.009 -0.013 -0.015 -0.010 -0.016 -0.017 -0.015 -0.012 
Education level (human capital) 1.351** 1.664*** 1.026* 1.629*** 0.258 0.438 0.266 0.454 
Trade 0.559*** 0.622*** 0.551*** 0.754*** 0.520*** 0.570*** 0.565*** 0.905*** 
Distributive expenditure   -0.944** -0.158 -0.274   -0.860* -0.661** -0.558 
Non distributive expenditure -0.726   -0.837* -0.029 -1.267**   -1.533*** -0.820** 
Direct taxes 0.591* 1.530***   1.204** 0.386 1.034*   0.925 
Indirect taxes 0.747** 0.911*** 1.205***   0.902** 0.768* 1.627***   
Constant -1.557*** -1.717*** -0.907 -1.773*** -0.267 -0.154 0.372 -0.019 
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 
R-squared 0.466 0.477 0.455 0.453 0.388 0.360 0.410 0.362 
VARIABLES Net Inequality Net Inequality 
Education level -2.443*** -2.326*** -2.436*** -2.396*** -2.402*** -2.313*** -2.256*** -2.365*** 
Growth -0.064 0.028 -0.117 -0.048         
Distributive expenditure   0.311 -0.472*** 0.096   0.479 -0.357** 0.192 
Non distributive expenditure -0.774***   -0.883*** -0.721*** -0.745***   -0.819*** -0.690*** 
Direct taxes -0.678*** -1.096***   -0.767** -0.684*** -1.343***   -0.854*** 
Indirect taxes 0.126 -0.728*** 0.395   0.087 -0.816*** 0.209   
Peronist party 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.010 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.009 
Constant 3.118*** 3.003*** 3.122*** 3.072*** 3.079*** 2.994*** 2.934*** 3.023*** 
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 
R-squared 0.667 0.632 0.657 0.666 0.666 0.630 0.651 0.663 















Trade 0.197* 0.113 0.199*** 0.522*** 0.177* 0.105* 0.205*** 0.528*** 
Lagged gross inequality 0.003 -0.0734* 0.006 0.011 0.047 -0.057 0.018 0.018 
Population >65 years 1.285** 0.521 0.197 0.267 1.296*** 0.506* 0.214 0.272 
Lagged GDP -0.349*** -0.157*** -0.117*** -0.096*** -0.313*** -0.140*** -0.138*** -0.119*** 
Senators -0.413 0.170 -0.334 1.137* -0.435 -0.087 -0.141 1.343*** 
House representatives 0.447 -0.011 0.176 -0.645* 0.432 0.146 0.084 -0.748*** 
Official party 0.009 0.013 0.013* 0.014** 0.013 0.014 0.011 0.0111* 
Provincial employment 2.991*** 2.433*** 0.661*** 0.374 2.953*** 2.471*** 0.684*** 0.343 
Transfers effect 0.198*** 0.168*** 0.059 -0.071** 0.231*** 0.192*** 0.028 -0.105*** 
Constant 1.224*** 0.564*** 0.463*** 0.489*** 1.031*** 0.465** 0.554*** 0.596*** 
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 
R-squared 0.727 0.739 0.569 0.663 0.725 0.738 0.565 0.658 
   Statistical significance: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. 
